A personal reflection on American political culture.
I write entirely to find out what I'm thinking... Joan Didion
I write entirely to find out what I'm thinking... Joan Didion
Course Outline and Reading Materials for Wellesley-Weston Lifetime Learning
The Butterfly Effect: Tipping Points in World History
Part II
First Session
Second Session
Third Session
Fourth Session
Fifth Session
Sixth Session
Seventh Session
Eighth Session
The Butterfly Effect: Tipping Points in World History
Part II
First Session
Second Session
Third Session
Fourth Session
Fifth Session
Sixth Session
Seventh Session
Eighth Session
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Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to transform the international world order at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 is one chapter of a much larger theme that has dominated the past 250 years of US foreign policy. To what extent are we an "exceptional” nation on planet earth, one obligated to extend the blessings of liberal democracy to those less fortunate, whether appreciative or not. Or are the demands on our exceptionalism limited to serving as a model for others to follow or not as they please. You’ll notice that in either case the “exceptionalism” usually remains unquestioned.
The first imperative has produced what is called the internationalist strand of American foreign policy, and the second our more traditional isolationist outlook. For most of the nineteenth century, the demands of Manifest Destiny and the Civil War it helped engender preoccupied our attention and isolationism dominated the outlook of American foreign policy. Only at the end of the century did we begin to flirt with an imperial foreign policy in our relations with the nations of Central America and the Pacific rim. Since then US foreign policy has exhibited an almost bi-polar character. It has swung from the internationalism of the Wilsonian world order to the isolationism of the 1920’s Republican ascendancy of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. It was then followed by our embrace of the American Century during World War II and the Cold War which followed. After our defeat in Vietnam and the demise of the Soviet Union we would begin a calculated withdrawal from the demands of exceptionalism only to see it re-emerge in the neo-conservative intervention of Bush 43 in Iraq, the reaction to which resulted in the substitution of soft power by the liberal realists of the Obama administration. Today the retreat from internationalism has culminated in the "America First" isolationist rhetoric of the Trump administration.
David Milne put it best in his Wilson Agonistes: The Battle Over Woodrow Wilson:
The first imperative has produced what is called the internationalist strand of American foreign policy, and the second our more traditional isolationist outlook. For most of the nineteenth century, the demands of Manifest Destiny and the Civil War it helped engender preoccupied our attention and isolationism dominated the outlook of American foreign policy. Only at the end of the century did we begin to flirt with an imperial foreign policy in our relations with the nations of Central America and the Pacific rim. Since then US foreign policy has exhibited an almost bi-polar character. It has swung from the internationalism of the Wilsonian world order to the isolationism of the 1920’s Republican ascendancy of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. It was then followed by our embrace of the American Century during World War II and the Cold War which followed. After our defeat in Vietnam and the demise of the Soviet Union we would begin a calculated withdrawal from the demands of exceptionalism only to see it re-emerge in the neo-conservative intervention of Bush 43 in Iraq, the reaction to which resulted in the substitution of soft power by the liberal realists of the Obama administration. Today the retreat from internationalism has culminated in the "America First" isolationist rhetoric of the Trump administration.
David Milne put it best in his Wilson Agonistes: The Battle Over Woodrow Wilson:
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And this is why Wilson’s presidency continues to speak to us. More than anyone’s, Wilson’s historical luster corresponds with the foreign policy in vogue at any given time. When retrenchment and realism hold sway, Wilson appears misguided, a blind eye doctor. When internationalism drives American diplomacy, Wilson is a visionary, his presidency a lodestar.
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As you peruse the materials below keep In mind the following issues that emerge from a close look at Wilson’s policy and its implementation at the Versailles Peace Conference.
Documents
- The issue of Wilson’s psychology and personality loom large in most evaluations of his conduct at Versailles and later his attempt to force acceptance of the treaty by the US Senate. To what extent were his visionary, idealistic impulses rendered ineffective by a sanctimonious rigidity that alienated rather than encouraged collaboration?
- There is also the question of how realistic and informed was Wilson’s understanding of the dynamics of the post-war European political, social and economic order. Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister, could only justify our entry into the war if it were seen through a redemptive lens, our objective must be to make the world safe from such a catastrophe ever occurring again. To what extent can the idealism of the visionary be grounded in an appreciation of the realities of the human condition?
- In his willingness to subsume all other issues to the acceptance of his League of Nations did Wilson unwittingly lay the foundations for conditions that would later result in war in 1939?
Documents
Wilson's Fourteen Points
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On Jan. 8, 1918, President Wilson, in his address to the joint session of the United States Congress, formulated under 14 separate heads his ideas of the essential nature of a post-World War I settlement. The text of the Fourteen Points is as follows:
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1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. 11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. 12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. On Oct. 3–4, 1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden, the German imperial chancellor, sent a note, via Switzerland, to President Wilson, requesting an immediate armistice and the opening of peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Germans would later argue a “betrayal” when faced by the harsher terms of the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles. |
Selected Terms of the Treaty of Versailles
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Territory:
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On Line Resources
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Web Articles
The Paris Peace Conference and its Consequences, Alan Sharp. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/the_paris_peace_conference_and_its_consequences “This article offers an overview of peacemaking after the First World War from the armistices of 1918 until 1923. It considers the outcomes of the five Parisian treaties (Versailles, Saint-Germain and Neuilly in 1919 and Trianon and Sèvres in 1920) together with the renegotiated settlement with Turkey at Lausanne in 1923. It analyzes the organization of the conference and the aims and ambitions of the leading personalities involved, concluding with an appraisal of reparations, self-determination and the reputation of the settlements.” Book Excerpt: Preface, The Treaty Of Versailles: A Concise History, 2017, Michael Neiberg, Oxford Univeristy Press http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/08/14/treaty-versailles-michael-neiberg In the Preface of his recent book, Neiberg presents an excellent overview of the background of the Versailles Conference and its place in the shaping of the history of the twentieth century. Versailles, in his own words serves "... as a warning from history of what not to do." How Did World War I End? The Treaty of Versailles https://www.historyonthenet.com/how-did-ww1-end-the-treaty-of-versailles/ An excellent concise overview of the policy positions and goals of the allied negotiators at Versailles. World War One – The Treaty of Versailles https://www.historyonthenet.com/world-war-one-the-treaty-of-versailles/ A basic outline of the major clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Lessons from History? The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Margaret MacMillan http://www.international.gc.ca/odskelton/macmillan.aspx?lang=eng Written in 2003 with an eye to the immanent war in Iraq, MacMillan presents a balanced revisionist analysis of the traditional take on the Versailles Conference as a failure. In doing so she also presents an excellent overview of the constraints, domestic, international and emotional which created an unfavorable atmosphere for negotiations. When the President Has a Stroke: Shedding light on the psychological travails of Woodrow Wilson, W. Barksdale Maynard, Ph.D. https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-guest-room/200911/when-the-president-has-stroke A brief overview of the role Wilson’s cardio-vascular health may have played in the growing intractability of his later years. |
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On Line Videos
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American Experience Woodrow Wilson Part 2, 80 minutes.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KdbriMGRNhQ If your a fan, as I am, of the PBS American Experience series you will enjoy this comprehensive overview of Wilson the man and the impact of his personal self on the unfolding events of WWI and the Versailles Conference. Excellent footage and narration. If you watch anything, this is the one. If you have time you might also look at Part I of this program, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2ouqYxUaq8 |
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The Treaty of Versailles, BBC 59 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74-HkCRozls A revisionist look at the events, politics and problems that shaped the Versailles Treaty’s negotiation, suggesting that the traditional judgement of a failed process that led to further war needs to be examined. As usual, an excellent BBC production, well worth watching. |
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The Best Intentions: The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, Greg Sirota, 30 minutes. https://vimeo.com/42947104
An excellent overview of the basic historical context of the peace conference. As its title suggests, its point of view is that perhaps we must accept that we live in an imperfect world where even the best of intentions can not overcome the political, social and cultural exigencies of the moment. |
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Woodrow Wilson's Second Term, 60 minute clip.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4716310/wilsons-term This is well worth your time. MacMillian is perhaps today's pre-eminent scholar on this period of history. Insightful and easy to listen to. "Oxford Professor Margaret MacMillan talks about President Woodrow Wilson’s second term from 1917 to 1921. Once the U.S. entered the first World War in 1917, the majority of President Wilson’s efforts focused on foreign affairs and diplomacy. Professor MacMillan speaks about President Wilson’s involvement in the Great War and his attempts at a 'lasting peace' through the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations." |
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BBC 1918-2008, Ninety Years of Remembrance: Armistice, 1918, 90 minutes
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=yTP532MWCuM I found this video particularly fascinating. It provides an insight into the events of the last year of the war, particularly the domestic German political and military situation which led to Germany's decision to seek an armistice. It highlights the role Wilson's Fourteen Points and the promise of a League of Nations played in their decision helping to explain the bitterness which ensued after the imposition of the Versailles treaty. |
Second Session
"Things Fall Apart; the Centre Cannot Hold" - Adolf Hitler Becomes Chancellor
"Things Fall Apart; the Centre Cannot Hold" - Adolf Hitler Becomes Chancellor
Chancellor Hitler greets President von Hindenburg, January 30, 1933
On December 20, 1924 Adolf Hitler walked out of Landsburg prison after serving nine months of a five year prison term for treason. The failure of the Munich Beer Hall Putsch had convinced him that revolution was not the road to power in Germany. From this moment forward his efforts would be concentrated on using propaganda, intimidation and legitimate constitutional means to advance the Nazi Party and undermine the Weimar Republic.
Soup kitchen, Germany circa 1930
Initially unpopular, especially in urban areas, the party concentrated its organizational and propaganda efforts in more rural and middle class population centers. While the party gradually increased in size it was the arrival of the Great Depression in 1929 that dramatically changed its fortunes. The depression hit Germany particularly hard. Economic recovery following WWI had largely been accomplished with United States financing and assistance in moderating the debilitating reparations payments imposed by the Versailles Treaty. With the collapse of Wall Street this assistance came to an end. Rising unemployment, 30% by 1932, the contraction of capital, and a drop in production, plus the ill advised policies of the Brüning administration all contributed to growing social unrest. Increasingly, extremists of the left and right dominated the political conversation while their armed followers fought one another in the streets. With the collapse of the center-right parties, the formation of a coalition in the Reichstag became increasingly difficult and minority governments became the norm.
Chancellor Franz von Papen
These conditions created the ideal milieu for the advancement of the Nazi party. Steadily their power in the Reichstag increased gaining 107 seats in the election of 1930 and 230 in the election of 1932. Unable to form a stable coalition government, President Hindenburg, using Article 48, ruled by decree. In the election of July 1932 the Nazi party received 37% of the vote, yet Hindenburg, distrusting Hitler, refused to appoint him as Chancellor. A minority government continued under the newly appointed Chancellor Franz von Papen, an aristocrat whose reputation was that of a crafty dilettante. More to the point, his economic policies of lowering wages, lowering corporate taxes and stringent means testing for unemployment benefits increased the anger of an already alienated citizenry.
Reichstag, August 1932
As the political situation evolved, the Reichstag was dominated by the Communist (DKP) and the Nazi (NSDAP) parties. The conservative and center parties ( DNVP, DDP, Z, DVP) lost effective control, and sought to manipulate the NSDAP to prevent a feared communist takeover. Unable to govern, new elections were called for in November in which the Nazi Party received 30% of the vote. Hindenburg appointed a conservative, Defense Minister Kurt von Schleicher, as the next Chancellor. Schleicher soon faced a vote of no confidence in the Reichstag and in early January asked Hindenburg to grant him emergency powers. Hindenburg refused to do so. Schleicher resigned on January 28. Behind the scenes von Papen had been negotiating with Hitler and proposed a new government to Hindenburg with Hitler as Chancellor, von Papen as Vice-Chancellor and a cabinet including three Nazi members. The argument made to Hindenburg was that Papen as Vice Chancellor could control Hitler. It was better to have Hitler in the government rather than threatening it from without. According to von Papen: "Within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak,” Following the announcement of Hitler's appointment, Hindenburg’s former army commander, Paul von Ludendorf, telegrammed the president: “…you have handed over our Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time … Future generations will curse you in your grave for this action”. The rest, as they say, is history.
The new cabinet, January 30, 1933
As we explore the events outlined above, keep in mind the following considerations.
The historical narrative of these few months provides an excellent example of how the arc of history is not as logical as it may seem from hindsight. The appointment of Hitler was not inevitable. As you read and watch consider what key events, conditions and people came together to produce this result and how it might have all ended differently.
The past eighteen months of our contemporary political life have given rise to numerous comparisons between the historical rise of Hitler and the election of Donald J. Trump. I have included several in the readings that follow. Consider to what extent these comparisons may or may not be useful. Were there lessons not learned? Are there useful parallels that a thoughtful person should reflect upon? How fragile are the normative values and structures of our civil society?
Lastly, what can we learn about human nature from examining this history, both then and now? Facing History and Ourselves, a non profit educational development organization established to create curriculum and train teachers to promote the “… development of a more humane and informed citizenry," chose its name well. In looking closely at history we are in effect facing our own humanity. There was nothing strange or unusual about the millions of individuals who made up the population of Germany in the 1920’s and 30’s, nor is there now in the United States. Society's, governmental institutions and structures are nothing more than the aggregate of the individuals who populate them, support them and make them functional.
Documents
The historical narrative of these few months provides an excellent example of how the arc of history is not as logical as it may seem from hindsight. The appointment of Hitler was not inevitable. As you read and watch consider what key events, conditions and people came together to produce this result and how it might have all ended differently.
The past eighteen months of our contemporary political life have given rise to numerous comparisons between the historical rise of Hitler and the election of Donald J. Trump. I have included several in the readings that follow. Consider to what extent these comparisons may or may not be useful. Were there lessons not learned? Are there useful parallels that a thoughtful person should reflect upon? How fragile are the normative values and structures of our civil society?
Lastly, what can we learn about human nature from examining this history, both then and now? Facing History and Ourselves, a non profit educational development organization established to create curriculum and train teachers to promote the “… development of a more humane and informed citizenry," chose its name well. In looking closely at history we are in effect facing our own humanity. There was nothing strange or unusual about the millions of individuals who made up the population of Germany in the 1920’s and 30’s, nor is there now in the United States. Society's, governmental institutions and structures are nothing more than the aggregate of the individuals who populate them, support them and make them functional.
Documents
Political Spectrum 1930's Germany
Political Representation Weimar Germany 1924 - 1933
On Line Resources
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Web Articles ThoughtCo. These brief overviews are an excellent narrative introduction to the basic chronology of the events which led to Hitler being offered the Chancellorship. How Treaty of Versailles Contributed to Hitler’s Rise, Rober Wilde. https://www.thoughtco.com/treaty-of-versailles-hitlers-rise-power-1221351 The Early Development of the Nazi Party, Robert Wilde https://www.thoughtco.com/early-development-of-the-nazi-party-1221360 Adolf Hitler Appointed Chancellor of Germany, January 30, 1933, Jennifer Goss https://www.thoughtco.com/adolf-hitler-appointed-chancellor-of-germany-1779275 Interwar Germany: The Rise and Fall of Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, Robert Wilde https://www.thoughtco.com/rise-and-fall-of-weimar-germany-1221354 The BBC Bitesize website is exactly as advertised. An excellent place to start with any inquiry presenting small easily digestible servings. The charts and graphs as well as propaganda posters help one understand the gradual growth of the Nazi Party and its popularity over time in Germany. http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/tch_wjec/germany19291947/1hitlerchancellor1.shtml The US Holocaust Museum’s web site is an great source for information on this period of German political history. This is an excellent short overview of the history of the Weimar Republic. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia: The Weimar Republic https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008222 In his review of Volker Ullrich’s acclaimed new biography Hitler: Ascent, Richard Evans explores the reasons why democracy collapsed in Germany. Short of reading Volker in its entirety, this is one of the best narratives of the social, cultural and political factors that coalesced in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. Book Review A Warning From History, The Nation, February 28, 2017, A new biography of Hitler reminds us that there is more than one way to destroy a democracy, By Richard J. Evans https://www.thenation.com/article/the-ways-to-destroy-democracy/ A view from the American left, Jacobin Magazine. Hitler Wasn’t Inevitable, Marcel Bois https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/11/nuremberg-trials-hitler-goebbels-himmler-german-communist-social-democrats How Hitler went from fringe politician to dictator — and why it's a mistake to think it couldn't happen in the US, Henry Blodget Oct. 19, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/hitler-trump-comparisons-2016-10 Brief, well written overview tracing Hitler’s rise to power from his childhood to his Chancellorship. The Nazi triumph: how did Adolf Hitler become the Fuehrer of Germany? https://dailyhistory.org/The_Nazi_triumph:_how_did_Adolf_Hitler_become_the_Fuehrer_of_Germany%3F Weimar Germany and Donald Trump. How traditional and radical conservatives come to speak a common political language—that ultimately benefits the extremists, By Eric D. Weitz Eric D. Weitz is Distinguished Professor of History at The City College of New York. He is the author of Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/207665/weimar-germany-and-donald-trump Confused by the number of parties and overlapping policies of the German political scene in the 1930's. This is the place to be. A succinct and very readable overview of the political landscape. Facing History and Ourselves. Weimar Political Parties, Professor Paul Bookbinder, University of Massachusetts Boston. https://www.facinghistory.org/weimar-republic-fragility-democracy/readings/weimar-political-parties On Line Videos |
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Excellent examination of the underlying reasons for Nazi assent to power in 1933. It incorporates interviews with many who were witnesses to the events unfolding from 1919 to 1933 including former Nazi party members. The film provides an excellent feel for the evolving social-political culture of Weimar Germany.
The Nazis, A Warning From History. Episode 1: Helped Into Power BBC, Laurence Rees, 1997 48 minutes http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xq1ym0 If you have the time and interest, I also highly recommend Episode 2 of this series, Chaos and Consent, which documents the first years of Nazi rule with emphasis on means and methods of control and Hitler’s chaotic management style. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xq226f |
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Peter Jennings narrates a chronological account of the rise of the Nazi party from the end of WWI through the first year of Hitler’s rule. ABC News: The Century: Evil Rising: Hitler's Path to Power, 1999, Peter Jenning narrator. 50 minutes https://vimeo.com/14007531
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Third Session
Munich, Chamberlain, and the Uses of History
Munich, Chamberlain, and the Uses of History
Neville Chamberlain arrives at Heston Aerodrome, Friday, September 30, 1938.
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George Santayana's famous aphorism is often cited as a motivational tool in encouraging the study of history. Something I often resorted to in my own teaching career. Yet, one needs to be wary of this advice. Too often history is treated as if it were a gold mine to be excavated looking for some nugget of information which will provide unassailable historical evidence to support some ill conceived observation. Among recent historical events, perhaps none has risen to the level of misuse as has the Munich Agreement of September, 1938.
The perfect casualty of 20/20 hindsight, Neville Chamberlian's famous "peace for our time" declaration has become a trope often used as a cudgel against any argument favoring diplomacy over military solutions. Appeasement at Munich enabled Hitler's appetite for conquest whereas a line drawn in the sand would have caused him to at least reassess his strategy, and perhaps have prevented war. At least that is how the usual argument is formulated. Echoes of Munich have hovered over the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Vietnam, Operation Desert Shield, the invasion of Iraq, and most recently, our response to North Korea. Over time the historiography of Munich has evolved into a more tolerant, less judgmental evaluation of Chamberlain. Once harshly condemned as weak and ineffectual, recent historians have presented a more nuanced view of the many factors, domestic, political, international, and military, among others, that influenced the foreign policy of the British Conservative government in 1938. Events are never as simple as they seem.
In this session we will take a look at the events themselves which culminated in the Munich agreement hopefully coming to deeper appreciation of the complexities of this particular history as well as discussing how it has been used and is still being used to legitimize foreign policy.
We will begin our investigation with a short video created by James Lindsay of the The Council of Foreign Relations that will introduce you to the basic history of the event.
The perfect casualty of 20/20 hindsight, Neville Chamberlian's famous "peace for our time" declaration has become a trope often used as a cudgel against any argument favoring diplomacy over military solutions. Appeasement at Munich enabled Hitler's appetite for conquest whereas a line drawn in the sand would have caused him to at least reassess his strategy, and perhaps have prevented war. At least that is how the usual argument is formulated. Echoes of Munich have hovered over the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Vietnam, Operation Desert Shield, the invasion of Iraq, and most recently, our response to North Korea. Over time the historiography of Munich has evolved into a more tolerant, less judgmental evaluation of Chamberlain. Once harshly condemned as weak and ineffectual, recent historians have presented a more nuanced view of the many factors, domestic, political, international, and military, among others, that influenced the foreign policy of the British Conservative government in 1938. Events are never as simple as they seem.
In this session we will take a look at the events themselves which culminated in the Munich agreement hopefully coming to deeper appreciation of the complexities of this particular history as well as discussing how it has been used and is still being used to legitimize foreign policy.
We will begin our investigation with a short video created by James Lindsay of the The Council of Foreign Relations that will introduce you to the basic history of the event.
Documents
Annexation of Czechoslovak territory after Munich.
Bohemia and Moravia would become German "Protectorates" in March, 1939
Compiled by Michael McMenamin and the Editor, International Churchill Society
https://www.winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-162/munich-timeline/
Dramatis Personae
Edvard Benes,
Pres. Czechoslovakia,
'35 - '38
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Anthoney Eden, Foreign Minister '35 - '38
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Neville Chamberlain,
Prime Minister '36 - '40
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Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister '38 - '40
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On Line Resources
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Web Articles
This is where you should begin. An excellent overview of the basic background and events leading up to the Munich agreement. World War II: Munich Agreement, How Appeasement Failed to Deter World War II, by Kennedy Hickman, Updated March 18, 2018 https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-ii-munich-agreement-2361475 A revisionist argument examining why we should not be too hard on the much "maligned" Chamberlain. Neville Chamberlain Was Right, Nick Baumann, Slate,September, 28, 2013. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/09/neville_chamberlain_was_right_to_cede_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html In his review of David Faber’s Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II, Childers provides an excellent summary of the circumstances and assumptions which motivated Chamberlain at Munich plus his own evaluation of Faber’s analysis. “…and is there nothing more you want?”, A.C. Childers, Open Letters Monthly, an Arts and Literature Review https://www.openlettersmonthly.com/book-review-of-munich-1938-by-david-faber/ Kershaw relates his narrative of the events leading up to Munich to the evolving historiography of the period. Well written analysis. The Twisted Road to War, The Guardian, August 23, 2008. Ian Kershaw https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/aug/23/history.secondworldwar Siracusa examines the "metaphor" of Munich as weakness from the Cold War to the Gulf War. Very interesting! The Munich Analogy, Joseph M. Siracusa, Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Munich-Analogy.html Shachtman argues that it is time to "retire" the Munich Analogy. In doing so he provides an interesting catalogue of its use and misuse over the past seventy years. It’s Time to Abandon ‘Munich’ After 75 years, foreign policy's uber-analogy needs to go. Tom Shachtman, Foreign Policy, September 29, 2013. foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/29/its-time-to-abandon-munich/ An interesting reflection on the use of the past, a la Munich and appeasement, on the current North Korean conflict. The Return of the Iraq War Argument, Uri Friedman, The Atlantic, March 21, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/iraq-north-korea-war/555929/ On Line Videos |
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Part 1 of the BBC’s 8 part series on the origins of WWII examines the post World War I domestic political landscape in England and how it informed the British foreign policy of appeasement. Excellent series.
The BBC’s The Road to War, Part I, Great Britain. 1989 50 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZNBXF2Tdmo |
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An animated debate among four British historians as to whether Chamberlain got it right or not.
Neville Chamberlain Did The Right Thing. iqsquared, June 12, 2013, 90 minutes. Published on Jun 12, 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmyecSXOla8 |
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The much acclaimed Munich novelist Robert Harris explores the 1938 meeting between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlin and Adolf Hitler that granted territory in Czechoslovakia and many of its resources to Germany. C Span, Book TV, January 22, 2018.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?439979-1/robert-harris-discusses-1938-chamberlain-hitler-munich-summit |
Fourth Session
Operation Barbarossa - a Bridge Too Far
Operation Barbarossa - a Bridge Too Far
Adolf Hitler studies a Russian war map with General Field Marshal Walter Von Brauchitsch, left, German commander in chief, and Chief of Staff Col. General Franz Halder, on August 7, 1941.
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It is debatable to what extent Adolf Hitler developed a coherent ideology informing his political and military planning. Given that caveat, it is clear that the central tenent was racial in nature. The German nation was the embodiment of the Übermensch, the superior individual, the master race whose destiny was to control, exploit, enslave and in some cases eradicate those who were inferior. We see this as early as February 1920 in Hitler's 25 point party program declaring racial purity and the conquest of inferior races as the two central goals of National Socialism. In 1925 in Mein Kampf Hitler elaborated further specifying that it was Germany's destiny to expand into eastern Europe replacing its inferior Slavic populations with deserving Arian stock who were entitled to lebensraum, living space.
None of this was really new. These ideas and racial tropes had been part of popular culture in Germany for quite some time. What was new was Hitler's determination to actually implement them in a very literal sense. Coupled with this racial animus was the particular association Hitler made between Jews, Marxism and the Soviet Union. They were, for all practical purposes, one and the same. Hitler saw Marxism as an existential threat, a jewish conspiracy designed to subjugate Germany and the civilized world. In a 1939 conversation with Carl Burckhardt, Swiss Commissioner to the League of Nations, Hitler castigated the West for its inability to appreciate this menace: "...if those in the West are too stupid or too blind to understand this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against the Soviet Union."
None of this was really new. These ideas and racial tropes had been part of popular culture in Germany for quite some time. What was new was Hitler's determination to actually implement them in a very literal sense. Coupled with this racial animus was the particular association Hitler made between Jews, Marxism and the Soviet Union. They were, for all practical purposes, one and the same. Hitler saw Marxism as an existential threat, a jewish conspiracy designed to subjugate Germany and the civilized world. In a 1939 conversation with Carl Burckhardt, Swiss Commissioner to the League of Nations, Hitler castigated the West for its inability to appreciate this menace: "...if those in the West are too stupid or too blind to understand this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against the Soviet Union."
Poster for Reich's Farmer's Day, 1936. Notice the modern helmet coupled with a medieval knight's armor. The knight looks east towards a symbolic red star/ hammer & sickle representing the threat of Soviet Marxism.
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Thus we have Generalplan Ost, (GPO} first drafted in 1940 and further revised in '41 and '42 which outlined the systematic operations necessary to kill, either by military action or starvation, 20 to 30 million Slavs and Jews. This is the essential underpinning for the decision in summer 1940 to plan and then in June 1941 to launch Operation Barbarossa. The invasion of the Soviet Union was not a conquest in the usual geo-political sense, but was the fulfillment of a racial destiny mandated by the laws of nature. To understand this is also to understand why, in the final analysis, Hitler refused to follow the counsel of his military advisors. He, as Fuhrer was endowed in a messianic sense with a vision that could not, would not, fail.
– Der Bannerträger (“The Standard Bearer”), by Hubert Lanzinger, circa 1935
For the purposes of our discussion keep in mind the following questions.
DOCUMENTS
- From the German perspective were there other military options which made more sense in the Spring of 1941?
- What were the strategic/tactical mistakes which culminated in disaster?
- What if wiser heads had prevailed and Operation Barbarossa was a success?
DOCUMENTS
https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/operation-barbarossa-timeline?print=1
On Line Resources
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Web Articles
Good place to start. A basic narrative chronology of the events followed by a brief analysis of why it failed. Operation 'Barbarossa' and Germany's Failure in the Soviet Union, Ian Carter, Tuesday 9 January 2018, Imperial War Museums. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/operation-barbarossa-and-germanys-failure-in-the-soviet-union A collection of 45 photographs. Worth a look-see. World War II: Operation Barbarossa, Alan Taylor July 24, 2011 45 photos, The Atlantic. www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/07/world-war-ii-operation-barbarossa/100112/ This CIA book review examines the possible reasons why Stalin was caught unprepared the morning of June 22, 1941. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa, Intelligence in Recent Public Literature By David E. Murphy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005. 310 pages. Reviewed by Donald P. Steury. www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm A very readable analysis of the underlying reasons for the failure of Operation Barbarossa. Ultimately it is a matter of hubris. "Chapter Seven, Hitler’s Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941," from the book Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk,Bonny Lin, 2014, RAND Corporation. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.14?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents From the Army War College, a military analysis of whether the Wehrmacht could have succeeded. Yes, if the commanders could have commanded! "The World Will Hold Its Breath": Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa, R. D. Hooker, Jr., from Parameters, Spring 1999, pp. 150-64. ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/articles/99spring/hooker.htm On Line Videos |
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If you can only watch one video for this session, this is the one. This acclaimed 28 part series, although close to fifty years old, still remains one of the best series documenting WWII.
The World At War, EP-5 Barbarossa, 1974, Thames Television, Jeremy Isaacs producer. www.dailymotion.com/video/x125euz |
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An 18 part Russian made documentary in the BBC style. Narrative is in English, but maps and visuals use Cyrillic script. Fairly well received, it is one the few Russian WWII documentaries available to western viewers. Parts I and 2 are most relevant to our discussion.
Soviet Storm. WW2 in the East - Operation Barbarossa. Episode 1. StarMedia, 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CerdjvePsg&feature=player_embedded |
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This episode covers the winter, spring, and summer of 1940-41. While not focused specifically on Operation Barbarossa, it is excellent for showing how this operation fit into the larger context of the war helping us to understand why German resources had been stretched to a breaking point.
World War II׃ The Complete History 07/13, The British Movietone Company, 2000, Episode 7, The Day of Infamy, 52 minutes. www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwjevtSywS4 |
Fifth Session
Down the Rabbit Hole
Vietnam - Deconstructing the Evolution of a Policy
Down the Rabbit Hole
Vietnam - Deconstructing the Evolution of a Policy
“Where should I go?" asked Alice.
"That depends on where you want to end up." - replied the Cheshire Cat.”
Lewis Carroll
"That depends on where you want to end up." - replied the Cheshire Cat.”
Lewis Carroll
For the better part of my professional life I have been preoccupied by the problem of our involvement in Vietnam. Not an unusual preoccupation given my age and generation. I still recall with clarity my anxiety as I queued, manila x-ray envelope in hand, at the South Boston Naval Station for my pre-induction physical--I failed. Good academician that I am, I read, and read widely and copiously. The more I read the more I found myself drawn to explanations reflecting research drawn from the cognitive sciences and studies of confirmation bias. While I have no definitive answer, I can taste the beginnings of one, and it runs something like this.
In our perception of reality, to borrow from the physical sciences, it is as if our mind abhors a vacuum. We are hard wired to search for meaning, to connect the dots so to speak. In doing so we often resort to the use of analogy and metaphor. Once formulated, these explanations behave according to a psychological law of inertia, continuing on a trajectory continually confirmed by further encounters with perceived reality. All of this is reinforced by a social component, the desire to conform to acceptable norms we identify with. The thing is, our perceptions often bear only slight resemblance to the factual reality we are attempting to understand. We like to imagine ourselves as rational beings subjecting our conclusions to the rigors of logic. More often than not I suspect that the phenomenon of confirmation bias is at work rather than the dispassionate detachment of rationem.
In our perception of reality, to borrow from the physical sciences, it is as if our mind abhors a vacuum. We are hard wired to search for meaning, to connect the dots so to speak. In doing so we often resort to the use of analogy and metaphor. Once formulated, these explanations behave according to a psychological law of inertia, continuing on a trajectory continually confirmed by further encounters with perceived reality. All of this is reinforced by a social component, the desire to conform to acceptable norms we identify with. The thing is, our perceptions often bear only slight resemblance to the factual reality we are attempting to understand. We like to imagine ourselves as rational beings subjecting our conclusions to the rigors of logic. More often than not I suspect that the phenomenon of confirmation bias is at work rather than the dispassionate detachment of rationem.
Our analogies may be apt or not, but in either case they often misappropriate detail which is unconsciously applied to the "new" situation without analysis. Yes, a comparison can be made between Munich in 1938 and Soviet expansion in eastern Europe in 1947, but closer examination reveals the myriad political, social, cultural, and historical differences which should modify our comparisons and policies. Could "containment" inhibit Soviet expansionism, thus building on the hard lesson learned by "appeasement" at Munich? Was there actually a centrally orchestrated red tide of communism spreading over the globe much like the famous Sherman-Williams paint can? The use of metaphor also can be fraught with its own pitfalls. We tend to forget that "countries" in reality are not "dominoes." They are not as uniform as dominoes, and actually behave quite differently from one another due to their particular cultural-social circumstances and histories. The problem is that we act upon these analogies and metaphors appropriate or not. In the sphere of foreign policy this has produced unintended and tragic consequences.
We have to start somewhere, and in this instance, to understand the inception of our involvement in Vietnam I have chosen to begin with the dictation of a 5500 word telegram on February 22, 1946. Often called the "Long Telegram" it encapsulated the thinking of George F. Kennan, deputy head of mission in the United States Embassy in Moscow. Harry Truman, a new president of less than one year, with little foreign policy experience, was struggling to articulate a coherent foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Struggling, because at that point there was little agreement among the mandarins of the foreign policy establishment as to what the Soviet Union was all about and what its intentions were, and correspondingly what our responses should be. The necessities of a war time alliance had papered over many cracks which now waited to be addressed. It was into this milieu that Kennan's telegram landed with more effect than he could ever have anticipated.
We have to start somewhere, and in this instance, to understand the inception of our involvement in Vietnam I have chosen to begin with the dictation of a 5500 word telegram on February 22, 1946. Often called the "Long Telegram" it encapsulated the thinking of George F. Kennan, deputy head of mission in the United States Embassy in Moscow. Harry Truman, a new president of less than one year, with little foreign policy experience, was struggling to articulate a coherent foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Struggling, because at that point there was little agreement among the mandarins of the foreign policy establishment as to what the Soviet Union was all about and what its intentions were, and correspondingly what our responses should be. The necessities of a war time alliance had papered over many cracks which now waited to be addressed. It was into this milieu that Kennan's telegram landed with more effect than he could ever have anticipated.
George F. Kennan
Excerpts from the Long Telegram
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At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns. |
Here we have the beginnings of what would later become known as the policy of containment. What is new here is the lens Kennan views the behavior of the Soviet Union through. Soviet policy was not so much driven by Marxist ideology, which Kennan viewed as a "fig leaf," but rather by traditional Russian insecurities. He further concluded that although Soviet antipathy to the west and capitalism was implacable it was nonetheless responsive when confronted with force. As events in Europe and Asia unfolded in 1946 and 1947, they gave credence to this assessment. The resumption of war between Communist and Nationalist forces in China, attacks by the Viet Minh on French forces reestablishing dominion in Indochina, Communist rebels in the Philippines, a Communist insurrection in Greece, Soviet sponsored election victories in eastern European capitals all seemed to fit the paradigm constructed by Kennan. In the words of Isaacson and Thomas in The Wisemen, "...Kennan formulated a containment theory that was embraced in Washington with an ethusiasm that soon caused him to squirm. As Henry Kissinger has noted, 'Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.' "
"Embraced" is the word to note here. "Containment" was not necessarily studied or subjected to a harsh and rigorous analysis based on factual information in each of the situations to which it was applied. It seemed to fit most situations well. It became more a matter of intuiting than understanding, and then later, just a matter of habit. With each succeeding administration, it would continue to be the template we applied to the unfolding of events whether fully warranted or not. The Berlin blockade in 1948, the "fall" of China in 1949, the Korean invasion of 1950, they all fit. The perception that the United States was involved in an apocalyptic world struggle with "godless, atheistic, monolithic communism" often preempted the conclusions by others in the field providing analyses based on observation and research. In this light, it becomes understandable how we inexorably, step by step, became mired in Vietnam. Each step, from Truman's decision to support the French in Indochina, to Eisenhower's decision to supply aid to the embattled French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was made in the shadow of the doctrine of containment. It is ironic, that later in life George Kennan became a harsh critic of the very policy he gave birth to, complaining that it had been stretched beyond recognition and misapplied. On the Vietnam conflict he would say the following.
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Our present involvement in Vietnam is a classic example of the sort of situation we ought to avoid if we do not wish to provoke in Moscow precisely those reactions that are most adverse to our interests... Not to worry so about these remote countries scattered across the southern crescent (Southeast Asia), to let them go their own way, not to regard their fate as our exclusive responsibility, to wait for them to come to us rather than our fussing continually over them. Lecture at Princeton University: "The United States and the Communist Giants," The New York Times, 25 February 1965. |
In the end it is apparent that Alice's question in The Looking Glass was rarely asked, never mind anyone giving heed to the catepillar's answer. Where are we going? Where do we want to be?
Time Line
Time Line
Source: https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war-timeline
On Line Resources
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Web Articles If you are interested in some of the points I raised at the very beginning of this piece concerning cognition and bias you might want to take a look at this. Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, New Discoveries About the Human Mind Show the Limitations of Reason, Elizabeth Kolbert, The New Yorker, February 27, 2017. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds This book review by Louis Menand of John Lewis Gaddis’s biography of George Kennan is both wonderful to read, and also an excellent overview of Kennan's career and the development of his thinking in the context of unfolding events from the '40s to the '60s. Getting Real, George F. Kennan’s Cold War, Louis Menand, The New Yorker, November 14, 2011. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/14/getting-real This analysis is by James Thomson, who served under the Johnson administration, as special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1963–64), and from 1964 to 1966 as the China specialist on the staff of the National Security Council. He resigned in protest of our Vietnam policy in 1966. A very penetrating analysis of why it went so wrong in the foreign policy establishment of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy The Atlantic, April, 1968 James C. Thomson https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1968/04/how-could-vietnam-happen-an-autopsy/306462/ One of the earliest and most colorful Americans involved in Vietnam was CIA operative Edward Lansdale. He is most likely the model for both Graham Green's The Quiet American as well as Lederer and Burdick's The Ugly American. Menand's review of Max Boot's recent biography of Lansdale presents an excellent overview of the period and the strategy in those early years of our involvement. What Went Wrong in Vietnam, the military historian Max Boot takes on the counter-insurgency maven Edward Lansdale, Louis Menand, The New Yorker, February 26, 2018. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/26/what-went-wrong-in-vietnam McClintock provides an overview of Lansdale's popularity in the Kennedy administration combined with an analysis of his counter insurgency beliefs. Edward Geary Lansdale and the New Counterinsurgency Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990 © 2002, Michael McClintock www.statecraft.org/chapter8.html If you want some heavy lifting, I can recommend Hannah Arendt's reflections upon the release of the Pentagon Papers. Lying in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers, Hannah Arendt, The New York Review of Books, November 18, 1971. www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/11/18/lying-in-politics-reflections-on-the-pentagon-pape/ |
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If you own or have access to Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie I recommend reading Book Two: Antecedents to a Confrontation which examines the earliest years of American involvement.
Kindle Edition:www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&keywords=a+bright+shinning+lie&tag=googhydr-20&index=aps&hvadid=241885948725&hvpos=1t1&hvnetw=g&hvrand=5075731408740762465&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=e&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9002082&hvtargid=kwd-3819017186&ref=pd_sl_3sd5ui80tm_e iBook Edition: itunes.apple.com/us/book/a-bright-shining-lie/id420672475?mt=11&ign-gact= Nook Edition: www.barnesandnoble.com/w/bright-shining-lie-neil-sheehan/1100300024;jsessionid=82EEBDFA115C90CD348F4933501E1F09.prodny_store02-atgap04?ean=9780679603801#/ |
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On Line Videos
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Ken Burn's series on Vietnam is the best that there is for examining the complex history of this tragedy. In Part I "Déjà Vu 1858-1961" he presents the historical background of the earliest years of our involvement. I apologize for the subtitles, but due to the newness of this series it is difficult to find free sources of streaming. If you have access to iTunes, Amazon video, or Vudu you can stream it from those sources for $6.99. vimeo.com/261509698 |
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Broader in scope than the Ken Burns series, CNN has put together a comprehensive 24 part series on the origins and development of the Cold War. Excellent footage and narrative by Kenneth Branagh combined with contemporary interviews of eye witness participants. Part 2: Iron Curtain, 1945-1947. www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qLsDX6sXwE |
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CNN Part 11, Vietnam, 1954-1968 www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnKCDyj8KSY
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Suggested Readings
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Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969.
Isaacson,Walter and Thomas,Evan. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: a History. New York: Viking Press, 1983. Kennan, George F. At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982-1995. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1996. Sheehan, Neal. A Bright Shining Lie : John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988. |
Sixth Session
Kennedy Is Not Assassinated
Kennedy Is Not Assassinated
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“Probably no question in recent history is more poignant than what would have happened if John F. Kennedy had not chosen to visit Dallas on November 22, 1963. Barely more than a year had passed since his most memorable success, the resolution of the missile crisis. What would the forty-six-year-old president have achieved if he had lived? How would the world have been different? In the chapter that follows, Kennedy’s biographer Robert Dallek reflects on some of the possible might-have-beens of a lengthened public career. Domestic reforms, especially in civil rights, are probably a given. But what about Cuba and our ever-expanding Vietnam ulcer? Or would his relentless womanizing or his fragile health have derailed his progress toward greatness?
Kennedy was the youthful symbol of youthful age. Rarely in history has the death of one individual so tainted the future. Would the sixties have turned quite so sour if the nation, and the world, had continued to depend on, and take nurture from, his special grace under pressure? We still would have had the Beatles and Woodstock, the miniskirt, women’s liberation, Twiggy, the Twist, the Prague Spring, and Swinging London. But would our energies have been diverted to outlets more creative, more fruitful, than protesting a war in Vietnam that he might have terminated? Would we have been spared the Chicago riots at the 1968 Democratic convention, the SDS occupations of Columbia and Harvard, Watts, Charles Manson, LBJ and Richard M. Nixon, and the assassinations not only of JFK but of his brother and Martin Luther King? And Watergate?” Excerpt From: Robert Cowley. “What Ifs? Of American History.” New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2003, pp 354-55 
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Most of our generation can remember exactly where they were on November 22, 1963 when they heard the news of Kennedy's assassination in Dallas. I was in the parking lot outside Robert's Center on the lower campus of Boston College. It was a Friday afternoon and day students were heading home early. Every where I looked there were students standing in groups, listening to car radios.
It is not often that the course of history is altered by the death of one individual. Harold Godwinson at Hastings, Kaiser Frederick III, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, all of these deaths presaged momentous changes in world history. In this session we will look at the past sixty years to identify some of the key developments that might have turned out differently. What follows is a by no means a definitive list of some areas to ponder.
It is not often that the course of history is altered by the death of one individual. Harold Godwinson at Hastings, Kaiser Frederick III, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, all of these deaths presaged momentous changes in world history. In this session we will look at the past sixty years to identify some of the key developments that might have turned out differently. What follows is a by no means a definitive list of some areas to ponder.
- Martin Luther King and civil rights and a voting rights act.
- Domestic social legislation, would there be Medicare and Medicaid?
- Response to the rioting in the inner cities 1964 -1968.
- The war in Vietnam, increasing involvement or withdrawal?
- Woodstock Nation, where would the energies of America's youth flowed?
- Relations with Cuba, recognition and reconciliation?
- Relations with the USSR and nuclear disarmament.
- The 1968 election, who would JFK support? Would Nixon be defeated?
The list goes on.......
Here are some web sites your might poke around on for ideas:
This is one of the better pieces I came across..highly recommended.
The JFK anniversary: What if Kennedy had lived? From Vietnam to Cuba, two historians sketch out an alternate history of the twentieth century, James G Blight and Janet M. Lang, New Statesman, August 15, 2013.
https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2013/08/jfk-anniversary-what-if-kennedy-had-lived
A brief overview of the major areas that might be different. Good introduction to the topic.
History's Favorite Guessing Game: What If JFK Had Lived? Eric Levenson, The Atlantic, November 21, 2013
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/historys-favorite-guessing-game-what-if-jfk-had-lived/355359/
Any cursory Google quest on this topic inevitably brings up the name of Jeff Greenfield innumerable times. Since his publication of If Kennedy Had Lived, he has been quite popular in print and on the lecture circuit.
JFK at 100: If Kennedy had lived, would we be in this mess? Jeff Greenfield, May 29, 2017, Politico
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/29/jfk-at-100-215204
Excerpted from JFK and LBJ: The Last Two Great Presidents by Godfrey Hodgson, this Solon article gives an in depth analysis of the evidence concerning what Kennedy might or might not have done re Vietnam.
The ’60s great what-if: What would John F. Kennedy have done about Vietnam? Godfrey Hodgson, Solon, June 7, 2015.
https://www.salon.com/2015/06/07/the_60s_great_what_if_what_would_john_f_kennedy_have_done_about_vietnam/
In this short piece, Sean Wilentz, professor of history at Princeton, examines JFK's likely policies in the area of civil rights
What if Kennedy Had Lived? by Sean Wilentz, N.Y. Times, 21, 2003.
www.nytimes.com/2003/11/21/opinion/what-if-kennedy-had-lived.html
Podcast, nine minutes. I've always been a big "Here and Now" fan. Good intro to the whole JFK Vietnam topic.
WBUR Here and Now: Vietnam War: What If JFK Hadn’t Been Assassinated? Monday, November 18, 2013, Robin Young and Edward Miller.
Here are some web sites your might poke around on for ideas:
This is one of the better pieces I came across..highly recommended.
The JFK anniversary: What if Kennedy had lived? From Vietnam to Cuba, two historians sketch out an alternate history of the twentieth century, James G Blight and Janet M. Lang, New Statesman, August 15, 2013.
https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2013/08/jfk-anniversary-what-if-kennedy-had-lived
A brief overview of the major areas that might be different. Good introduction to the topic.
History's Favorite Guessing Game: What If JFK Had Lived? Eric Levenson, The Atlantic, November 21, 2013
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/historys-favorite-guessing-game-what-if-jfk-had-lived/355359/
Any cursory Google quest on this topic inevitably brings up the name of Jeff Greenfield innumerable times. Since his publication of If Kennedy Had Lived, he has been quite popular in print and on the lecture circuit.
JFK at 100: If Kennedy had lived, would we be in this mess? Jeff Greenfield, May 29, 2017, Politico
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/29/jfk-at-100-215204
Excerpted from JFK and LBJ: The Last Two Great Presidents by Godfrey Hodgson, this Solon article gives an in depth analysis of the evidence concerning what Kennedy might or might not have done re Vietnam.
The ’60s great what-if: What would John F. Kennedy have done about Vietnam? Godfrey Hodgson, Solon, June 7, 2015.
https://www.salon.com/2015/06/07/the_60s_great_what_if_what_would_john_f_kennedy_have_done_about_vietnam/
In this short piece, Sean Wilentz, professor of history at Princeton, examines JFK's likely policies in the area of civil rights
What if Kennedy Had Lived? by Sean Wilentz, N.Y. Times, 21, 2003.
www.nytimes.com/2003/11/21/opinion/what-if-kennedy-had-lived.html
Podcast, nine minutes. I've always been a big "Here and Now" fan. Good intro to the whole JFK Vietnam topic.
WBUR Here and Now: Vietnam War: What If JFK Hadn’t Been Assassinated? Monday, November 18, 2013, Robin Young and Edward Miller.
Michael Beschloss and Jeff Greenfield: If Kennedy Lived. 92nd Street Y. 1hr 14min. www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Y_khImoGoY
If Kennedy Lived Jeff Greenfield talked about his book, If Kennedy Lived: The First and Second Terms of President John F. Kennedy: An Alternate History. 45 min. www.c-span.org/video/?315872-1/if-kennedy-lived
Virtual JFK is a 1hr 22min documentary movie released in 2008 directed and produced by Koji Masutani. I have not watched it as yet. It received fairly good reviews. It limits itself to the question of Vietnam. It is available for rental on iTunes and Amazon Video
Seventh Session
Bush et al. v. Gore et al. Cetiorari Denied
Bush et al. v. Gore et al. Cetiorari Denied
In the realm of "what if" history, perhaps one of the most fascinating turning points occurred at the doorstep of our current century. At about 10:00 pm on December 12, 2000 the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in the case of Bush et al. v. Gore et al, 531 US 98, reversing the ruling of the Florida State Supreme Court and upholding the official vote count of the Florida Secretary of State. By a margin of 537 votes, ( .009) George W. Bush became the 43rd President of the United States.
The outcome of this election could conceivably have been quite different. Any number of contingencies could have produced a different result. In this session we will use our historical imaginations and what we know about Albert Gore to construct an alternative reality as he is presented with a similar flow of events.
The outcome of this election could conceivably have been quite different. Any number of contingencies could have produced a different result. In this session we will use our historical imaginations and what we know about Albert Gore to construct an alternative reality as he is presented with a similar flow of events.
- 9/11 Some have conjectured that a Gore presidency would have taken a more serious look at the warnings which came in as early as April 2001 of an impending Al Qaeda attack. Alternatively, assume that Gore had not prevented the attack, how would he have responded in both the near and long term? There is a lot to consider here: our military response in Afghanistan, our domestic response ie. the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
- War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 2003. Would it have happened at all? Assuming it did not, what would our Middle East policy have looked like? To what extent would our military involvement in Afghanistan have been different? How would a Gore administration have confronted a growing terrorist threat from Al Qaeda and ISIS?
- The Economy The Bush administration had to deal with two recessions, the smaller one of 2001-02 after the dot com bubble crash and the "Great Recession" of 2007-09. Would a Gore administration have been more prescient? The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 was built on the premise of returning the Clinton/Gore surpluses to the people. What if these surpluses had continued? Would a Gore administration have undertaken a restructuring of the tax code?
- Domestic Legislation What would have been the major domestic policy goals of a Gore administration? During his campaign he had stressed improvements in education, health care, technology and strengthening Social Security.
- The Supreme Court What was the effect of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore on its reputation and prestige? Did this signal the extension of Congressional partisanship and gridlock to the Court itself? Would Sandra Day O'Connor have retired if Gore had won? Who would have replaced Justice Rehnquist? Would there ever have been a Citizens United?
- Election of 2008 Assuming a two term presidency with Lieberman servicing as vice president both terms, what would the political landscape have looked like for both parties in 2008? Would it have been Lieberman vs. Romney? Would Obama have entered the fray?
On Line Resources
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Web Articles
This is the best place to refamilarize yourself with the events leading up to the Supreme Court decision. An excellent narrative of what was going on behind the scenes plus analysis of the legal implications. Very readable. The Path to Florida, David Margolick, Vanity Fair, March 19, 2014. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/10/florida-election-2000 In this well reasoned essay, Balkin reviews the effects of the SC decision on the prestige of the Court and reflects on the role of politics within the Court. Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, Jack M. Balkin, Yale Law School http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1250&context=fss_papers This short piece examines the missed opportunities of the first few months of the Bush administration in appreciating a possible Al Qaeda attack. Helpful in forming an opinion on whether Gore would have responded differently. The Deafness Before the Storm, By Kurt Eichenwald, New York Times, Sept. 10, 2012 https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/opinion/the-bush-white-house-was-deaf-to-9-11-warnings.html In reviewing Frank Harvey's "Explaining the Iraq War", Steele examines his "counter factual" arguments as to why the election of Gore would not have been enough to keep us out of war in Iraq. Why Al Gore would have invaded Iraq (and what it tells us about Syria), Andrew Steele, The globe and Mail September 4, 2013 https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/why-al-gore-would-have-invaded-iraq-and-what-it-tells-us-about-syria/article14105322/ An overview of the basic policy differences during the election. Gore vs. Bush on Key Issues, ABC News, January 6, 2006 https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=122748&page=1 This is more creative fiction than virtual history, but it still presents some interesting alternatives. "Ten years ago this month, a Supreme Court ruling ushered in George W. Bush as our 43rd president. We asked five (sometime) novelists to imagine the past decade as if the election had gone the other way. America: This is your parallel life." Memories of the Gore Administration, New York Magazine, December 5, 2010. http://nymag.com/news/politics/gore/ A year by year narrative of the Gore administration outlining the major policies and achievements, all quite within the bounds of possibility. A very interesting "thought experiment." The Gore Presidency: An Alternative History by William Cox, featured writer,Dandelion Salad, Sept. 25, 2008, www.thevoters.org https://dandelionsalad.wordpress.com/2008/09/25/the-gore-presidency-an-alternative-history-by-william-cox/ |
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After Bush v. Gore (2016), Insignia Films, We produced After Bush V. Gore for Retro Report, in association with the New York Times. The piece explores the dramatic controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election, which led to sweeping voting reforms, but opened the door to a new set of problems that continue to impact elections today. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdYJDJQw5nM
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A fine narrative overview of the election controversy.
Bush v. Gore: The Endless Election (2015), CNN https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcz6NSyxrfQ |
Eighth Session
Slouching Towards Singapore
Slouching Towards Singapore
Dean Acheson, National Press Club, January 12, 1950
On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a now famous speech on US foreign policy in the Far East to the National Press Club. The contextual background for this speech included, among other considerations, the recent "loss of China" with the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. The Truman administration, and the State Department in particular, was enduring a torrent of criticism from the Republican right for having allowed this "avoidable catastrophe." Senator Joseph McCarthy in particular charged that the State Department, "thoroughly infested with communists," was responsible for this "loss."
Accordingly, the diplomatic world paid particularly close attention to Acheson's statement concerning the "military security of the Pacific area."
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In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australia—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is not intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.
The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. |
Notably missing from this "defensive perimeter" was South Korea. In regards to the rest of the Pacific region, including Korea, Acheson went on to say:
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So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.... |
On June 20, 1950 Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, when questioned during a Congressional hearing as to possible North Korean invasion plans, reported that "we see no present intention that the people across the border have any intention of fighting a major war for that purpose." One can reasonably conclude, therefore, that when Dean Acheson was awakened by his White House phone on June 24, shortly after 10:00 pm at Harewood Farm, his home in Sandy Spring Maryland, the last thing he expected was the news that North Korea had invaded South Korea. Some months later Acheson would reflect that "if the best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible location to fight a war, the unanimous choice would have to have been Korea." And so began a 68 year history of American attempts to sort out one of the most resistant unresolved issues of the Second World War. The Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945 led to the immediate invasion of northern Korea with a corresponding advance of United States forces from the South. A much younger Dean Rusk working with Charles Bonesteel proposed the 38th parallel as an administrative line separating the two armies.
Before beginning our discussion of the current state of U.S. North Korean diplomacy it would be useful to refresh our memories with first, an overview of the historical background from the 1930's to the present, and then a brief description of the Korean War.
Background:
Before beginning our discussion of the current state of U.S. North Korean diplomacy it would be useful to refresh our memories with first, an overview of the historical background from the 1930's to the present, and then a brief description of the Korean War.
Background:
- Division of Korea, New World Encyclopedia
www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Division_of_Korea
- The US and North Korea: a brief history
World Economic Forum December 19, 2017, Adam Jezard
www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/12/north-korea-united-states-a-history
- Korean War, a ‘Forgotten’ Conflict That Shaped the Modern World, New York Times, January 1, 2018, Liam Stack
- BBC History, The Korean War: An Overview, Michael Hickey, last updated 2011-03-21.
- CNN, The Cold War, Episode 5, Korea 1949-1953, narrated by Kenneth Branagh
www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSnu8l6xss4
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Moving on to the state of contemporary relations with North Korea, we are reminded of the volatility of negotiations with the Kim Jong Un regime by the recent about face in Kim's willingness to meet President Trump in Singapore this coming June 12. While not unexpected by the "old hands" of the foreign policy establishment, it has thrown into sharp relief the relative inexperience of the present administration. The lack of a unified message has not escaped Kim as utterances from official Washington have swung from the heavy handed immediate denuclearization or military action stance of John Bolton to the gradualist-realist approach of Secretary of State Pompeo. At the moment Kim seems to be responding to Bolton's disdain for diplomacy with his own reminder that to succeed the United States has to put something important on the table as well. Administrations hoping for any modicum of success in negotiating complex situations in international relations have to enter into them with a well formulated agreed upon position that reflects deep insight into the historical-political landscape of the opposite partner. We shall see to what extent this pertains in the current circumstances.
Below are several of the articles that I have been reading on this matter which I hope you will find useful in preparing for our next class discussion.
Below are several of the articles that I have been reading on this matter which I hope you will find useful in preparing for our next class discussion.
- Perception and Misperception on the Korean Peninsula: How Unwanted Wars Begin, By Robert Jervis and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Foreign Policy, May/June 2018 Issue. Jarvis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, and is a member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in the School of International and Public Affairs. Rapp-Hooper was formerly a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is currently at the Center for a New American Security.
97309.pdf
If you prefer a downloadable PDF copy of the above article use this link: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:183983/content/204820.p - The Right Way to Coerce North Korea: Ending the Threat Without Going to War, Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, Foreign Policy, May/June 2018 Issue Cha was a member of the Bush 43 NSC as Director for Asian Affairs. His nomination as Ambassador to Korea was withdrawn by Trump administration in January 2018. Katrin Katz was also a member of the NSC from 2007-08 serving as Director for Japan, Korea, and Oceanic Affairs.
97308.pdf - A Real Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula: The Progress and Promise of the Moon-Kim Summit, Chung-in Moon, Foreign Policy, April 30,2018. Chung-in Moon is Special Advisor to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea for Foreign Affairs and National Security.
a_real_path.pdf - The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option, Scott D. Sagan, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2017 Issue. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and has served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon and as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Sandia National Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
966008.pdf - Getting Tough on North Korea: How to Hit Pyongyang Where It Hurts, Joshua Stanton, Sung-Yoon Lee, Bruce Klingner, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2017. Joshua Stanton is a CAS Fellow, founder of OneFreeKorea, and an attorney in Washington D.C. Joshua has assisted the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, with the drafting of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act. Sung-Yoon Lee is Kim Koo-Korea Foundation assistant professor of Korean studies at the Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.
cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/clarkd/upload/Getting%20Tough%20on%20North%20Korea.pdf - 3 Kims And 6 U.S. Presidents Later, Diplomacy Can Still Solve The North Korea Crisis, Siegfried Hecker,
08/18/2017, Huffington Post. Hecker is a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-korea-nuclear_us_5991ee7be4b09071f69bc1a6?xjn - Stanford Experts Examine Options for U.S. in Dealing with North Korea, Stanford News, September 22, 2017, Gi-Wook Shin and Michael R. Auslin. Michael R. Auslin is the inaugural Williams-Griffis Research Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in global risk analysis, U.S. security and foreign policy strategy, and security and political relations in Asia. Gi-Wook Shin is a professor of sociology, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
https://news.stanford.edu/2017/09/22/considering-options-u-s-north-korea-relations/ - Korea Summitry: Avoiding Catastrophic Failure and Catastrophic Success, Richard N. Haass, Foreign Affairs, May 25, 2018.
how_trump_can_best_manage_the_north_korea_problem.pdf - North Korea's Deadly Dictator | Watch S35 E15 | FRONTLINE | PBS October 3, 2017.
www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/north-koreas-deadly-dictator/
